Hmm. That’s a very interesting article.
At first the article claims
… could fork the ALGORAND chain very easily
And later on
… fork the ALGORAND chain very easily also
Yet, we both know very well that so far the Algorand network has not forked.
( even though, it’s “easy”; right ? )
I think that there are at least three aspects that are completely ignored by the article.
First, the implementation doesn’t use 1/3 and 2/3. In most cases, the actual implementation require higher committee thresholds. ( i.e. enforces higher security than required by the Algorand original design )
Second, the assumption of “having 1/3 corrupted” is meaningless if you can’t tell which 1/3 you’re truly referring to. The VRF is ensuring that a voter/proposer would figure it out only when it matter most, hence - removing the “target” from any potential participant. It cannot be realistically “predicted” any easier than breaking a cryptographic signature.
Last, almost half (48%) of the voting stake is maintained by the Algorand Foundation. The Algorand Foundation sole purpose is to support the Algorand network; hence, they cannot be “bribed”.
To sum this up, easy, it’s not going to be…