@Adri Thank you for the update and taking into account at least some of the concerns raised.
That said, there are still some pain points left that need to be addressed to improve and decentralize the Governance.
The biggest pain point is that there is still no option for keeping the status quo for Measure 1. While there is good intent behind it, this is a step away from decentralization since emission of rewards has already been decided in the past with community agreement (i.e. in Governance period 1 in reference to the Algorand Economic Evolution Report). A unilateral change by the Foundation to the reward distribution should not be made. Instead, the Foundation should communicate the merits behind the change to try to convince the community and let it decide whether to accept the change or not.
Nevertheless, it is true that the Foundation has never explicitly made a pledge to abide by the decisions made by the Governors, thus it has every right to make unilateral decisions. In light of this fact as well as due to the core issues of previous measures (e.g. trying to change who can vote and their voting power) it would be useful to come up with Algorand Governance Constitution to set in stone these basic rules of Governance (as it was already suggested in this thread before the start of Governance) .
Algorand Governance Constitution
The Constitution should define:
- who has the right to vote, e.g. any account that can issue the registration transaction during the registration period
- what is one’s voting power, e.g. the committed ALGO amount held in the primary account (i.e. a wallet) or delegated accounts (i.e. amount held in DeFi pools - tracked through e.g. LP tokens) if held throughout the whole Governance period
- duration of a Governance period
- time of registration, voting and cooldown windows
- how measures can be proposed and decided to be put to the general vote, i.e. the xGov (with a detailed description of what that actually means)
- how the Constitution can be changed (e.g. only with a supermajority support of at least 66% of Governors and the agreement of the Foundation)
- the form of proposal questions, e.g. that there is always the option of keeping the status quo (blockchains in general, and especially Algorand, are risk averse and have the notion of decentralization at their core; hence status quo is always preferred over a change enforced by a minority/centralized entity because consensus on the current status has already been reached)
- if a proposal concerns distribution of community funds (e.g. for Governance rewards), it must always be time-limited. If a duration is not explicitly stated in the proposal, it is assumed to be up to the end of the next Governance period. An accepted proposal for a longer duration can be cut short if approved by a Governance vote.
- the pledge that the Foundation respects the decisions of Governors and does everything in its power to facilitate execution of the passed decisions
- how Governors can influence the (general) operation of the Foundation. For example, if the majority of Governors think the Foundation inadequately fulfills the role of responsible stewards of the ecosystem or does not abide by the decisions accepted through Governance, the Governors could, e.g. vote to change the CEO, and/or would need to approve the Foundation’s board members.