Hey everyone,
Please see the proposal below. The core change is the focus on a smaller number of pools and the addition of a significant new initiative to bring users to Algorand and engage with Meld Gold.
Standard Pools (~27%)
Pact:
7.58%— $xUSD <> $GOLD$
7.58% — $xUSD <> $SILVER
Tinyman:
1.9% — $GOLD$ <> $COOP*
1.9% — $SILVER$ <> $COOP*
*COOP CRV has approved a matched commitment of 10,000 COOP to each pool.
AlgoRai:
8.28% — $GOLD$
Token Wars (15.16%)
Messina, Pact & Compx.
As in the previous Token Wars, Meld Gold will focus the initiative within the Algorand ecosystem incentivising new tokens to enter and pair with GOLD$ & SILVER$. Compounding will be optional with users having the choice of participating via ‘traditional’ farms or compounding farms.
Coinbase Quests (15.16%)
Meld Gold in conjunction with several leading Algorand projects will collaborate in Coinbase Quests, where hundreds of thousands of users are expected to participate completing activities from creating a wallet to doing a swap. Meld Gold will contribute “Year of the Dragon” NFT prizes, with the competition designed to have multiple engagement points and build a stronger relationship with the incoming new users.
Cheers Mike,
My personal feedback on TokenWars is TDR should not be allocated to automatic sale solutions. I’m for defending the allocation towards TokenWars, but not if it just applies sell pressure on algo and buy pressure on the pairs involved. I believe the current autocompound solutions work like this and so alternative workarounds must be found, or incentives shouldn’t be asked to support. This detail is crucial prior to voting as only became apparent the week of launch last time.
I understand time periods are always an issue, but similar to other proposal responses I’m fully against asking TDR to incentivise unmodelled ideas that also can’t be shared in advance to allow others to try to model the impact of them themselves.
I’d go as far as to say, this should be blocked and not allowed at all. Three month slowness has always been an issue. If blocking these “trust me bro” ideas would have caused you and other businesses to rally behind fixing the speed of governance then I see blocking these ideas as further benefiting Algorand.
I won’t be supporting or voting for anyone who can’t receive feedback prior to voting beginning, even if the idea does turn out to be potentially brilliant in the end.
TDR should either require feedback or it shouldn’t. Listening to feedback is a choice, requiring it should not be.
The current Meld Golds Token Wars initiative doesn’t require compounding to participate; users can choose to compound or go via the usual farms. So, this wouldn’t be an issue in this case, but I definitely agree there needs to be enough time for feedback. What is an acceptable amount of time for us to publish the additional details needed to allow feedback? 2-3 days?
Regarding governance speed, punishing projects for something out of their control is not ideal. It also wouldn’t yield the outcome you want. I can assure you efforts have been made, but it really is out of our hands. The community rallying behind fixing the speed of governance is far more likely to succeed. I had assumed it was going to be addressed with the incoming governance update, but don’t quote me on that. There is probably a longer, separate conversation about governance overall. For example, I believe all voters should read each proposal before voting; otherwise, abstain. Like some of your thinking, I don’t think reading a proposal before voting should be a choice.
I like COOP (both the token and the guy) but I don’t think it is appropriate to be using TDR for incentivizing those pools. TDR should be focused on helping to build long term liquidity in the ecosystem for key assets. Devoting money to a COOP/Gold or COOP/Silver pair seems like it is just going to result in opportunistic yield farming.
I own GOLD, I own COOP. 100% of both are in LPs with other assets. Creating an LP incentives for COOP/GOLD may incentivize me to reallocate previously existing liquidity to soak up extra yield, but it isn’t going to get me to keep it in that pairing long term. When the incentives go away, that liquidity will be reallocated to something else where I can pick up yield.
Hey @GhostOfMcAfee
Thanks for the feedback and thanks for being a holder, appreciate the support!
I do think most pairs will face the same issues for example ALGO / GOLD$ or USD / GOLD$ pairings would also struggle to keep liquidity without incentives (while the AMMs are constant product only without volumes really increasing). But Meme pairings will need higher rewards than when GOLD$ or SILVER$ are paired with more robust assets.
To combat this it was key that the COOP CRV are providing 50% of the incentives while keeping the TDR component of the reward low (sub 2% for each pair) with the COOP CRV also locking up $1000 of each pairing within the DAO as permanent liquidity.
It is really working towards a collaborative effort with the Coop community but keen to see if any of the above impacts your thinking.
Thanks again.
This part is important in my opinion since it helps offset some of the opportunistic degen yield farming.
I agree with you also that even the stable pairings have this problem to some extent, which is part of my problem with TDR in general. TDR was expressly to be a “temporary” method for bringing in lasting liquidity and users. But it has seemingly become a permanent fixture of our ecosystem that mostly just rewards reallocating existing liquidity. If it isn’t having meaningful and lasting effects, the entire program needs to be reevaluated and something better put in its place.
As just an example, I think it would be an infinitely better spend of money to get GOLD and SILVER on several exchanges than it is to keep tossing money at DEX pairings. But, TDR doesn’t currently allow for that sort of thing. That’s a problem IMO.
Completely, TDR is good at driving certain user actions but needs to be coupled with other things at a minimum that are more long lasting such as token listings or product improvements (CLAM functionality etc) which also helps with the stickiness. If both can’t be done then the listings and stickiness improvements should be the priority.
I believe TDR in its current form with finish after this coming period, though TBC.
Hey @Dunn & @GhostOfMcAfee
I have added some additional details about the ‘New Initiative’ and Token Wars. Though Token Wars is not fully complete (token selection etc hasn’t be done in terms of what pairings will look like) I have added some additional boundaries to clarify some of the details particularly regarding the compounding.
Thanks as always.
Hey @GhostOfMcAfee
It is additions to Token Wars parameters and the ‘New Initiative’ it is more relevant to what Dunn was providing feedback on. But was keen to include you as well since you had been contributing.
Cheers Mike,
Also very keen to see how Quests turns out and evolves. If for some reason it is delayed, I’d still rather vote towards the allocation and then know the algo is dedicated and held. Semi shocked if this isn’t a larger distribution method for AF.
Appreciate your compounding note. There are definitely ways to avoid it on Algorand, I think the scheme moved so quickly last time and the focus/brainpower went towards sexy APY figures rather than what that truly meant for LPs and LPs without algo as part of the pair. With the extra time hopefully it’s not such a rush if it does get re-approved.
Hey Dunn,
For sure, at this stage we have a locked date for the Quests which is actually before the voting ends so in some ways it will be retrospective if it passes. If it doesn’t pass Meld will cover the TDR portion of the costs, even though it would be stretch the budget I think it will be brilliant for the ecosystem so has to happen.
I do agree the extreme nature of the APYs with compounding of high yield pools is definitely alluring. It will be something I was pass to the Token Wars team about making sure that is clearer.
Thanks as always!